On the night of June 3, vast parts of northern Israel went up in flames after Hezbollah fired rockets on the area. The raging fires burned more than 3,000 acres.
They are a painful reminder that the protracted war in Gaza not only is devastating for the people of Gaza and a threat to lives of the hostages held by Hamas, but also has serious consequences for northern Israel, much of which has become a largely abandoned war zone since October. It is increasingly evident that without a cease-fire, the situation at the northern border could rapidly deteriorate into a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah.
The two fronts have been linked from the very start of the war. Hezbollah entered the conflict on Oct. 8, firing on Israeli military positions in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights less than 24 hours after the Hamas attack from Gaza. Israel has since been locked in an arduous, albeit confined, war of attrition with almost daily exchanges of missiles, armed drones and rocket fire that demand constant and robust military manpower and resources.
The Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has stated repeatedly that Hezbollah will continue its attacks as long as the hostilities in Gaza continue. The group has indicated that even a pause in the fighting in Gaza would prompt it to — at least temporarily — stand down if Israel did the same, just as it did during the weeklong pause in fighting late last year. Any deal aimed at stabilizing the situation in the north will depend on reaching a conclusive resolution of the conflict in Gaza that Hamas accepts. Even then, displaced Israelis are understandably skeptical that a cease-fire followed by a diplomatic agreement can restore security and therefore have been pushing for significant military action.
That resolution cannot come fast enough for the more than 60,000 Israelis once living within five kilometers of the Lebanese border whom the Israeli government evacuated last fall. Thousands more have since left the area on their own. The mass evacuation of Israeli civilians and the creation of a de facto buffer zone have had severe consequences, enabling Hezbollah to fire much more freely at the northern towns of Kiryat Shmona, Metula and Margaliot without incurring the civilian casualties that could have led to a rapid escalation.
But it has still caused damage to many homes and infrastructure, and tens of thousands of Israelis who were moved to hotels still have no idea if and when they can return to their homes, or under what conditions. With the school year almost over and people needing to plan for the fall, many don’t have any idea whether they will ever be able to go back to their lives. Some have opted to leave the hotels and relocate for at least another year. Many are in economic distress because their businesses can’t function. The state has not provided them with a timeline or plan.
That Hezbollah entered the war is significant. The group is the linchpin of Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance, which includes the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and has worked tirelessly since the 2006 Second Lebanon War to build up its power. But the price of any further escalation, for both sides, would be immeasurably higher than in the previous conflict.
Still, the Israeli political echelon has prioritized defeating Hamas in Gaza, even though Hezbollah’s arsenal is far more potent. Israel claims it is making important tactical achievements against Hezbollah in its effort to secure the border. But with a steadily increasing number of drones and rockets being fired from Lebanon (May saw the highest number of attacks since October), it is probably now far more dangerous to walk around the nearly empty northern towns than in the cities near Gaza.
Hezbollah’s attacks have also been growing increasingly sophisticated with technologically advanced drones and precision-guided ammunition, demonstrating that Israel’s touted “tactical achievements” have failed to make a dent in the group’s capabilities. These advances may also indicate something even more ominous: Hezbollah might believe it is racking up strategic gains that outweigh its losses. The situation has created a terrible laboratory, where Hezbollah has had the chance to carefully study Israel’s defense and surveillance systems for a prolonged period. It is clearly looking for, and finding, Israel’s weak spots, in order to penetrate and overwhelm its defenses through multipronged and varied attacks.
That is why, for example, a Hezbollah drone attack on a military position on May 6 managed to kill two Israeli soldiers. This was despite being in what was considered a protected facility, according to a reserve Israeli military brigade general who noted that the location was targeted at a specific angle, reflecting likely prior intelligence on the position. And it is apparently why on June 5, at least two armed drones targeting soldiers positioned in the Druze Israeli village Hurfeish managed to hit their target without triggering sirens, killing one soldier and wounding nine more.
Hezbollah, in other words, may be preparing for an all-out war with Israel, in which its first and primary action will be trying to degrade and neutralize Israeli defenses.
Israeli military and political officials insist Israel cannot stop the war in Gaza, not just because Hamas is still not entirely defeated, but because of what it means for Israel’s power projection in the region, specifically vis-à-vis Hezbollah and Iran. Many Israeli officials believe another war with Hezbollah is a matter of time. Far-right politicians have now started to call for an invasion of Lebanon.
But the reality on the ground tells a different story. The military, which is accustomed to short wars, seems fatigued — as is the Israeli public, which wants a new government. And if Israel has not been able to dismantle Hamas, a much smaller and less formidable adversary, after eight months of war and a nearly 17-year blockade of Gaza, what makes Israelis think that they can defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon, even putting aside the high price in soldier and civilian lives? Continuing on the current trajectory of escalating tit-for-tat attacks is also dangerous, not just because of what Hezbollah is learning, but also because the risk of all-out war, even if no one wants one, is constantly rising because of miscalculations in the expanding battlefield and potency of the weapons used.
That could be part of why Benjamin Netanyahu’s war cabinet had approved a Gaza cease-fire deal, believed to be the same one that President Biden recently outlined and that was passed in a United Nations resolution this week. Mr. Netanyahu has kept formal acceptance of Mr. Biden’s proposal vague, but the war cabinet members — one of whom has since resigned — most likely understood that in addition to the urgency of seeing the hostages freed, the longer that the war of attrition with Hezbollah lasts, the more it is likely that Israel will be dragged into a deeper conflict — and not at a time of its choosing.
A Gaza cease-fire would almost certainly bring quiet to the north, allow much needed respite for the military, pave the way for residents to return to their homes and open up the potential for diplomatic understandings between Israel and Lebanon.
